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Abstract
This paper re-examines the relation between private economic performance and federal govern-
ment size in Canada over the long 1870-2011 time period. The particular focus is on whether
the effect of government size on private output has an inverted U shape with a tipping point. Its
innovation is to use nonparametric techniques to assess whether the quadratic form most often
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relationship is stable across the period. The empirical work does find a nonlinear relationship
with a tipping point but finds the quadratic form applicable only to the early 1870-1936 time
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rather than increasing output cost. It follows that policy prescriptions based on the fear that
further expansion in government size generates ever increasing cost become more problematic.
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1 Introduction
In Canada, as elsewhere, a considerable literature exists on the relationship between government
size and economic performance.1While much of that discussion relates historically to the question
of how government size responds to changes in income and output–Wagner’s Law–the strand of
the literature we are interested in reverses causality to ask whether government complements or
discourages private economic performance. A primary reason for the latter interest is because
most developed economies have experienced long periods of growth in the size and scope of
government so that periods of contraction trigger a concern that government size may have
become excessive, unduly constraining private performance. More recently, in part in response
to the development of endogenous growth theory, analysis has focused on the effect of government
size in relation to growth (Barro, 1990; Armey, 1995). Here the consensus view is that larger
size has a negative effect on the growth rate (at least in developed economies). For example,
Afonso and Furceri (2010, p. 527) investigate the effect of government size and its volatility on
economic growth in OECD and European Union countries and conclude that ”both dimensions
tend to hamper growth.” 2 Similarly Bergh and Henrekson (2011, p.1) conclude that ”most
recent studies typically find a negative correlation between total government size and economic
growth”. Finally, Facchini and Melki (2013, p.2) survey sixty investigations of the relation
between government size and economic outcomes and find that ”66.6% of the studies find a
negative effect from government size while only 8.3% find the opposite effect and 25.1% are
inconclusive.”
In this paper we re-examine this issue in relation to the size of the Canadian federal gov-
ernment over the long time period since Confederation (1870-2011). Federal size is particularly
important since the federal government remains responsible for the most basic levels of individual
and state security and because it is charged with counter-cyclical fiscal policy responsibilities.
3 Our analysis begins by asking that if government size did affect economic performance, what
would be the appropriate performance measure that could be linked meaningfully to government
size. Second we ask whether the expected effect of government size on performance would be
linear. Arguing first that in the long run it is the level rather than the growth rate of economic
performance that can be related meaningfully to government size and, second, that that rela-
tionship should be nonlinear with a tipping point, we test for the shape of that relationship
1 Important contributions to the general literature on the effect of government size on output include: Landau,
1983; Kormendi and Maguire, 1985; Ram, 1986; Grossman, 1987. Contributions relating government size and
output in Canada include Scully, 1989; Afxentiou and Serletis, 1991; Chao and Grubel, 1998; Petry, Imbeau,
Crete and Clavet, 2000; Voia and Ferris, 2013. Chao and Grubel (following Scully’s methodology) find the
optimal long run size of all governments in Canada to be about 34% of GDP.
2Afonso and Furceri (2010) find that a one percent increase in government size decreases output growth by
.12% for OECD countries and .13% for European Union countries.
3The latter is important because counter-cyclical Keynesian fiscal intervention becomes embodied in the long
run relationship linking government size and output.
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using the quadratic form. Robustness checks on the size and significance of the implied tipping
point indicate the need to correct both for correlations arising among the covariates across time
and for potential endogeneity arising between government size and private output. Although
doing so confirms the quadratic form, the size of the confidence interval about the tipping point
and the compatibility of the data with the cubic form lead us to adopt nonparametric modeling
methods that generalize the nonlinear form in ways that do not require imposing symmetry.
These investigations also lead to the discovery of a likely break in the form of the time series
around 1937. This serves to reconcile the plausibility of the divergent forms suggested by the
earlier parametric tests done over the entire period.
Our nonparametric method uses the spline-based method developed by Ma and Racine
(2013), Ma, Racine and Yang (2011) and Nie and Racine (2012) to describe the forms of the
unconstrained relationship arising in the data. They allow the unconstrained patterns of re-
sponse to different control variables to be illustrated in a convenient graphical way and in a
form that allows for the incorporation of endogenous regressors through the generation of in-
strumental variable (IV) nonparametric plots. The enhancement of the analysis of tipping points
by surrounding the point estimate with an appropriate confidence interval allows assessment of
whether or not a quadratic model estimate of optimal size is meaningful and thus relevant for
policy analysis. To anticipate our final conclusion, a tipping point is discovered in Canada for
the earliest (1870-1937) time period but not in the post 1937 time period.
2 Time series and endogeneity concerns with government
size and economic performance
The time series issue posed by the long run relationship between government size and the
alternative measures of economic performance can be seen in the following diagrams. In Figure
1 below we show government size, measured as the logarithm of the ratio of total non-interest
federal government expenditures to GNP (lnGSize), in relation to both the level of private
economic performance, measured as the logarithm of private output per capita (lnPY PC), and
its rate of change, the growth rate of private output per capita (PCGROWTH).4 As can be seen
from the top right panel of Figure 1, lnPY PC has risen more or less continuously over the past
century and a half in Canada. In contrast the bottom panel shows that the growth rate of per
capita output, PCGROWTH, does not increase, varying more or less randomly about a constant
mean of 1.88% per year. In econometric terms, the level of private economic activity is non-
stationary or integrated of order one, I(1), while its rate of growth is stationary or integrated of
4 Private output is defined as GNP minus total non-interest federal government expenditures.
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order zero, I(0).5 When we turn to examine the long run growth of government size, lnGSize
(the left panel) it is immediately apparent that abstracting from the spikes associated with the
two world wars, government size has increased continuously since 1870. Beginning from the low
level of 3.5 percent of GNP in 1870, federal government size increased to over 20 percent of GNP
by 1975, before falling back to 13.7 percent of GNP by 2011. In econometric terms, lnGSize is
I(1) or non-stationary. 6
– insert Figure 1 about here –
The significance of this time series issue is that when variables of different order are regressed
together, the resulting coefficient estimates can be interpreted erroneously. For example, a
regression that finds no relationship between an upward trending level of government size and
a stationary growth rate may lead to the rejection of a meaningful relationship arising between
the two levels. Similarly variables that trend either directly or inversely through time are often
misinterpreted as being causally related. Finally, stationary variables that are related through
time are often misinterpreted as implying a permanent rather than transient relationship between
measures. This suggests that when putting together longer run time series in a hypothesis test,
one should first look to their order of integration then, if relating I(1) variables, look for the
presence of cointegration among the set of interrelated variables. In our case we begin by
exploring the reasoning that would link together the two I(1) variables: government size and
the level of private output per capita.7
The second significant econometric issue to be faced is endogeneity. That is, while our
interest is on how government size affects private output, the literature investigating Wagner’s
Law argues that the increase in government size derives from an expansion in the scale and
complexity of the private economy. It follows that the ability to interpret the correlation between
government size and per capita output as a measure of governments effect on private output is
somewhat problematic. To be more precise about any one of these causal routes, the analysis
must control for the potential feedback that can come from induced changes to the other side.
This we discuss at length in Section 4 below. Before turning to these empirical issues, however,
5 The order of integration refers to the number of times a time series must be differenced before finding
stationarity. The adjusted Dickey Fuller test statistic for lnPY PC is -0.091 (constant) and is -10.016 (constant)
for PCGROWTH. The corresponding MacKinnon 1% critical value of -3.496 allows rejection of the hypothesis
that the growth rate is nonstationary.
6 The adjusted Dickey Fuller test statistic forlnGSize is -1.886 (constant) and is -6.99 (constant) for its rate
of change, D. lnGSize. The corresponding MacKinnon 1% critical value is -3.497.
7 While the analysis could begin by linking the two first differences, doing so loses the information that could
arise from a relationship between the two levels. Similarly because the business cycle is stationary over time,
transitory changes in government size that reflect purely countercyclical intervention may dominate the fewer
permanent changes in government size that are of interest to this analysis. By initially looking for cointegration
among levels we get a cleaner measure of the long run relationships (with the cyclical effects remaining in the
residuals). See Ferris (2014) for an expansion of this idea in relation to government size in New Zealand.
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we first motivate our empirical hypotheses through an overview of public choice theory on the
effect of government size on private economic performance.
3 Public choice and the effect of federal government size
on the private economy
Broadly speaking, public choice analysis views increases in government size as producing two
opposing effects on the output of the private sector. First in terms of generated benefits, initial
levels of government spending are viewed as providing basic levels of security and protection
that keep individuals safe from physical threats (through collective policing, national defense
and diplomatic services) and safe from internal harm (through the administration of justice
as codified in criminal and commercial law). Further expansion of these roles allow higher
levels and better qualities of policing and legal services that in turn permit individuals greater
predictability in their dealing with strangers thus helping to realize larger volumes of production,
trade and welfare (Coase, 1960; Becker, 1983; Wittman, 1995). To the extent that communal
services such as health, sanitation, social welfare, education, and research and development are
provided directly or, as in Canada’s case, funded indirectly by federal revenues, larger levels
of government spending increase the quality of productive inputs and through this the output
of the private sector (Dahlman, 1991; Thomson and Jensen, 2013). Even more directly, the
federal government’s provision and monitoring of transportation infrastructure provide inputs
that complement private capital and enhance private output (Karras, 1997; Sturm, Kuper and
de Haan, 1998). It follows that if the government undertakes projects in order of their social
merit, the social marginal product of government’s involvement in the private economy will
begin positively and fall as government size increases.
The opposing channel of influence focuses on the costs of government intervention. The ne-
cessity of funding government activities means that as government size grows, ever larger levels of
resources must be obtained from the private sector. Their acquisition through taxation–through
higher tax levels and often differential tax rates–decreases private output by discouraging the
supply of productive inputs and distorting the cost of their provision (Stuart, 1984; Usher, 1986).
Thus as the size of government grows, the tax price of government services increases. This has
led writers such as Grossman (1987), Scully (1989, 2000), Armey (1995) and Facchini and Melki
(2013) to argue that on net, larger government size must encounter diminishing returns that
at some point may reach the point where further increases in size reduce rather than increase
private output.8 The opposing effects of government size on private per capita output are illus-
8 Theories directed at explaining why government size may become too large include Niskanen’s (1968) theory
of the expansionary incentives of the bureau, Meltzer and Richard’s (1981) median voter theory, and Buchanan
and Tullock’s (1962) emphasis of the common pool problems arising in modern democracies.
6
trated in Figure 2 below. The level of government size that maximizes per capita private output
is illustrated as and is referred to as the tipping point.
– insert Figure 2 about here –
4 Testing for the nonlinear effect of government size and
the search for a tipping point
4.1 The baseline parametric model
The traditional test for whether government exerts an overall positive or negative effect on
private output uses the quadratic form to capture the predicted nonlinear effect of size on
private output and to evaluate whether current size is above or below the tipping point (in
Canada, for example, see Chao and Grubel, 1998). Hence we begin by using as our baseline
version of this parametric model:
ln
(
yt
Nt
)
= β0 +β1 lnGSizet +η2 lnGSize
2
t +β3 lnAgrict+β4 lnY oung+β5 lnUSiipt+ut (1)
where the dependent variable, ln( yt
Nt
) , represents the logarithm of private output per capita,
lnGSizet and lnGSize
2
t represent the logarithms of federal government size and size squared
while lnAgrict, the logarithm of the share of agriculture in the labour force, lnY oungt, the
logarithm of the percentage of the population age 16 and younger, and lnUSiipt, the logarithm
of the U.S. index of industrial production control for other nongovernmental influences on private
output.9 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these variables and detail on their sources.
The key point to be noted is that all variables except for one of the political variables (to be
introduced later) are I(1).
Equation (1) tests for an inverted-U shape to the effect of government size on output and
hence whether there is a tipping point. The level of ln( yt
Nt
) at which the curve reaches a maxi-
mum/minimum can be solved for as ( β1−2β2 ) and, if a maximum, is known as the tipping point.
9 The absence of long run data on factor inputs such as capital leads to reliance on proxies such as these
for long period analysis. The rational for their use include: the share of employment in agriculture captures
(inversely) the growing industrial base of production and urbanization of the Canadian economy; the percentage
young captures the effect of demographics, while the very close integration of the Canadian and US economies
means that the US index of industrial production captures common improvements in productivity arising across
the two countries. The small size of the Canadian economy relative to the US means that we can treat lnUSiip
as exogenous to the performance of the Canadian economy.
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In our case the value of per capita income ( yt
Nt
)∗ that corresponds to the tipping point δ is
δ = exp
(
β1
−2β2
)
(2)
with β1 > 0 and β2 < 0. The sign restrictions imply that a maximum for ln(
yt
Nt
) is reached at
a positive level of government size but are not imposed at the estimation stage. Our ultimate
objective is to derive a meaning measure of δ and its confidence interval (see the Appendix B
for details about confidence set identification).
In column (1) of Table 2 below we present the OLS estimate of equation (1) for the entire 1870
- 2011 time period. The results suggest that the set of variables used to explain private Canadian
output per capita performs well, perhaps even too well, with the high R2 and low Durbin-Watson
statistic showing classic signs of a spurious regression. The large absolute size of the adjusted
Dickey Fuller (ADF) statistic does, however, allow us to reject the hypothesis of a unit root.
This implies that the I(1) variables in column (1) are cointegrated enabling the interpretation
of the estimated equation as a long run equilibrium relationship arising among these variables.
Unfortunately, although the OLS coefficient estimates and their t-statistics are consistent with
our priors, particularly the suggestion that the relationship between government size and per
capita output has an inverted U-shape, only the coefficient estimates are super-consistent with
the standard errors likely biased downwards because of correlations arising among the covariates
over time. This becomes apparent when we correct for intertemporal correlations among the
covariates by presenting the dynamic OLS equation estimates (DOLS) in column (2). There it
can be seen that the inverted U-shaped relationship between lnGSize and lnPY PC found in
column (1) was fragile, with both lnGSize and lnGSize2 now losing their significance.
There is however a second source of bias in the estimates of the coefficients of lnGSize and
lnGSize2 as determinants of the variation in private per capita output. That is as discussed
earlier, endogeneity in the form of two way causality in the relationship between lnGSize and
lnPY PC is likely present in the data. When we test for this possibility by running a Granger
causality test, we find the probability that lnGSize does not Granger cause lnPY PC and vice
versa is zero in both cases (for all tests using two or more lags). Correcting for endogeneity
means finding instruments that are correlated with government size but not with the error term
in equation (1) so that the instruments influence private output only through their effect on
government size. Here we rely on previous studies of (federal) government size in Canada (see
for example, Winer and Ferris, 2008 and Ferris, Park and Winer, 2011) that have found two
political variables and the flow of immigration into Canada to be significant determinants of
government size. These variables: effective participation by the public in the electoral process,
lnEffectivepart; the percentage of seats won by the winning political party, lnSeats; and the
ratio of immigration to population, ln Imratio were then used as instruments in the two stage
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least squares (2SLS) equations.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 we present the 2SLS estimates, first uncorrected for
time persistence and then combined with the DOLS correction. In column (3) the effect of
instrumenting can be seen as allowing the quadratic effect of government size on per capita
output to reappear in the data. Because the sign and significance of the control variables
remain largely unchanged across all of these equations, the 2SLS estimates do provide greater
confidence that government size has had a positive but diminishing effect on private output.
The coefficient estimates suggest that the effect peaks at about 8.5% of GNP. As importantly,
the test for endogeneity now suggests that after instrumenting in this manner, the probability
that endogeneity remains in the relationship between lnGSize, lnGSize2 and lnPY PC is close
to zero. In column (4) the 2SLS equation instruments government size and adjusts dynamically
to account for intertemporal correlations among the right hand side variables. As expected the
intertemporal correction does increase the standard errors somewhat, however the probability
that the slope coefficient estimates are equal to zero never rises above five percent. The correction
for persistence also results in the estimate of the tipping point falling somewhat, now to 6.85
percent. As was the case with the earlier DOLS adjustment to the OLS estimate in column (2),
the intertemporal corrections have little effect on the coefficient estimates and standard errors
of two of the control variables (lnAgric and lnUSiip) but do reduce to insignificance the effect
of LnY oung, the percentage of the population 16 and below.
While the performance of the quadratic form in columns (3) and (4) and the significance of
the signs on lnGSize and lnGSize2 support the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped relationship
for government size, the relatively small size of the tipping point estimates and the change that
arises between columns (3) and (4) raise the question of how much confidence can be placed
on either estimate. Somewhat more generally, because the tipping point is the ratio of two
regression parameters a number of statistical issues arise when trying to establish an appropriate
confidence interval. To do so we adopt two strategies. First, the Delta method uses a truncated
Taylor series expansion and asymptotic theory to establish a Wald-type confidence interval.10
Adopting the 95% confidence criterion establishes Delta upper and lower bounds for column (4)
that are, respectively, -0.0513767 and 13.73884. The weakness of the Delta method is that as
the estimate of approaches zero, the tipping point becomes weakly identified. An alternative
method that does not require strong identification and hence is robust to mistakes in modelling
the form of the relation uses Fieller (1954). Using the ninety five percent confidence criterion,
the Fieller method in our case produces upper and lower bounds about the 6.85 estimate of the
tipping point of 1.3732 and 14.2883.11 In both cases the confidence interval established is quite
large and, in the Delta case, its size is sufficiently big that we cannot conclude with confidence
10 See Appendix B for particulars in the construction of the Delta and Fieller confidence intervals.
11 Bolduc, Khalaf and Yelou (2010) show that asymptotically Fieller’s solution and the Delta method give
similar results when the denominator is far from zero.
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that the tipping point is positive. These measures of uncertainty in the coefficient estimate
suggest a relatively flat surface in the function linking the logarithms of government size and
per capita output.
A further sign that the quadratic form may not fully capture the nonlinear relationship
arising between government size and private output is shown in column (5) where we replace
the quadratic relationship in (1) with a cubic one. The results mean that the cubic form is also
not inconsistent with the data and with an estimated tipping point that at the lower end of the
confidence intervals established above (at 3.21 percent). In this case the confidence intervals
about the estimated tipping point are somewhat tighter, with the Delta method generating lower
and upper bounds of 1.348 and 4.436 and the Fieller method producing not dissimilar lower and
upper bounds of 1.699 and 4.721.
5 Nonparametric analysis
Our tests for the hypothesized relationship between government size and private output per
capita shown in Figure 2 have thus far used two parametric models that confirm nonlinearity
but do not allow a very precise estimate of the tipping point. Because that investigation does
not suggest the superiority of one particular parametric form, we propose using nonparametric
methods. As in the earlier case of the parametric analysis we estimate conditional nonparametric
models without correcting for endogeneity. This allows a discussion of its general advantages
before we correct for endogeneity. The advantage of using nonparametric methods is that in
cases where an inverted-U shape is suggested, a tipping point can be re-estimated after relaxing
symmetry. That is, while the theoretic relationship between government size and private per
capita output shown in Figure 2 is not necessarily symmetric about the tipping point, the
quadratic model used to test for a tipping point imposes symmetry in its structure. Thus
our method checks whether the latter assumption is overly restrictive, whether it affects the
estimate of the tipping point and particularly its significance. We also check for time instabilities
nonparametrically, by breaking our sample into two time periods. Since in our case conditional
analysis is required, this allows us to analyze the information-content of the controls. Controlling
for endogeneity in the nonparametric regression insures that the confoundedness arising between
government size and private output is eliminated and a more unbiased relationship is estimated.
To implement the nonparametric spline-based method of Ma, Racine and Yang (2011), Nie
and Racine (2012) and Ma and Racine (2013) we assume that the conditional mean depends
on government size and the controls adopted earlier and follows a non-linear, unknown function
approximated by the best-fit B-splines that allows for heteroskedasticity of an unknown form.
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That is, we assume
ln(
yt
Nt
) = f(lnGSizet, Controlst) + σ(GSize, Controlst)wt (3)
where σ and wt are unknown and estimation is conducted assuming exogenous and possibly
endogenous covariates. In controlling for endogeneity we use the same instruments as those
employed in the earlier parametric analysis. Appendix C provides a more technical description
of the method used and generates the graphical representations of the fitted function together
with the partial effects associated with each covariate. It also provides point-wise confidence
bands. To control for endogeneity in the nonparametric conditional representation we estimate
a nonparametric IV following a method developed by Horowitz (2011)that uses regression spline
methodology. As a robustness check we use Darolles, Fan, Florens and Renault (2011) whose
method is modified for regression splines (because Darolles et. al. use local constant kernel
weighting). The instruments used are again the same as those used in the parametric regressions.
Appendix D provides a technical description of the implementation of the nonparametric IV
method. Because the nonparametric estimations do not account for the time series properties of
the data nor do they impose stationarity, nonparametric assumptions are not necessarily weaker
than the parametric assumptions used earlier (aside from relaxing the shape restriction). For
this reason, the estimated curves are not viewed as a formal test of the fit of (3). Rather we
view them as alternatives that can be used to suggest tractable parametric specifications and/or
alternative ways of estimating. Moreover, in the absence of consensus on the fit of the quadratic
model, relaxing the shape restriction can itself be informative. To provide a comparison with the
quadratic specification we look for tipping points in the nonparametric forms, for asymmetries
about them and for time instabilities. Given that linear and other finite-dimensional parametric
models make strong assumptions about the population being modeled, the nonparametric models
have the additional advantage of not relying on any functional assumptions, which reduces the
potential bias associated with any given parametric form.
Nonparametric estimation of (3) produces two sets of partial regression surfaces that we
report in Figures 3 and 4. In Figure 3 we present the model without instrumental variables
along with their confidence intervals.
– insert Figure 3 about here –
Figure 4 presents the model with confidence intervals when instrumental variables are used.
– insert Figure 4 about here –
Here the ’partial’ surfaces correspond to the estimated output plotted as a function of one
predictor with the remaining predictors (the covariates in (3) that do not appear on the axes of
the reported figures) held constant at their median values.
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A comparison of the results when endogeneity is and is not controlled for results in the
same overall pattern of findings as appeared with the earlier parametric regressions. In partic-
ular, when endogeneity is not addressed (as in Fig 3) we cannot identify an inverted U-shaped
nonlinear relationship between private per capita output and government size. However when
endogeneity is controlled for (as in Figure 4) the results match the general form of the inverted
U-shape obtained with the parametric model (when we controlled for endogeneity and used
the DOLS correction for the long run relationship). The nonparametric result in Figure 4 also
indicates that the underlying relationship is not perfectly symmetric about the tipping point.
In addition to describing the form of these curves, the partial surfaces can be used to find
the points at which the derivative of the nonlinear surface approaches zero. These points can
be used as diagnostic checks on the parametric estimates of the tipping points derived earlier.
To obtain these points we use the instrumental regression function derived from the structural
econometric model
E[Y − φ(Z,X)|W ] = 0, (4)
where Y is yt
Nt
, φ(Z,X) is an instrumental regression function that involves endogenous variable
Z (GSize) and exogenous variables X and instrumnets W to compute the partial derivative of
a nonparametric estimation. Here the Xs consist of (lnAgrict, the logarithm of the share of
agriculture in the labour force, lnY oungt, the logarithm of the percentage of the population age
16 and younger, and lnUSiipt, the logarithm of the U.S. index of industrial production control
for other nongovernmental influences on private output). The Ws consist of the instruments
used in the parametric regression: effective participation by the public in the electoral process,
lnEffectivepart; the percentage of seats won by the winning political party, lnSeats; and the
ratio of immigration to population, ln Imratio). To estimate this relationship we follow the
approach of Florens and Racine (2012) where the derivative function φ is the solution of an
ill-posed inverse problem computed using Landweber-Fridman regularization. The derivative is
then used to obtain the tipping point nonparametrically. In Figure 5 we present the derivative
function for the model with instrumental variables.
– insert Figure 5 about here –
The derivative plot shows that we have two values of zero one at Z = 1.4 and another one
at Z = 3.3, which confirms the visible maxima and minima in Figure 4.
5.1 The Quadratic versus Cubic form: The role of structural change
in the data
In this section we question whether the form of the relationship between government size and
per capita output changed over the analyzed period. Consequently we test for structural breaks
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using two methods: one that assumes a known break point (see the Chow Test in Table 3)
and the other that allows for nonstationary data with an unknown break point (see the Zivot-
Andrews test in Table 4). The results of other tests for a structural break are also presented
in Table 3. With all these tests we identify a break in the data in 1936. This appears as the
deep trough in lnPY PC in the top panel of Figure 1 (representing the depth of the Great
Depression).
Using 1936 as the break point, we divided the data into two sub-periods and re-estimated
the parametric and the nonparametric models. In both cases similar period-specific results were
found. In particular, an inverted U-shaped curve in the relationship between private output and
government size was found for the early (1870-1936) time period while in the subsequent period
no such curve could be identified. Consequently the first period of our analysis appears to be
the one that has driven the results found for the combined periods.
To see this point more clearly consider the results in Table 5. Column (1) of that ta-
ble presents the 2SLS estimates with the DOLS correction for 1870 - 1936 using the previous
quadratic model in lnGSize. In column (2) the same 2SLS estimate with the DOLS correction
is estimated but only for the later 1937 -2011 time period. Finally, in column (3) the same data
as in column (2) is used (for 1937-2011) to estimate a linear rather than quadratic model in
LnGSize. The results show a striking difference between the two periods. In early 1870-1936
period a tipping point can be clearly identified for the private output as a function of government
size that is similar in value to that found for the full sample, 6.67%). For the later 1937-2011
time period no tipping point can be identified. It follows that the results for the full sample
are likely driven by the first period of analysis. Because of the earlier concern with the use
of a specific parametric form, the nonparametric analysis presented in Section 5 was redone for
the two separate time periods. Again while no specific time series assumptions are imposed in
this analysis, the results confirm descriptively the findings described above. The early period is
consistent with a nonlinear relationship between government size and private output that peaks
whereas the later time period is not. This is apparent in Figures 6 and 7.
– insert Figure 6 about here –
– insert Figure 7 about here –
Inspection of the diagrams illustrates similar differences arising across the two sub-periods
for the effects of the percentage of labour force in agriculture and the effect of a younger labour
force on private output. While in the first sub-period the fall in agricultural participation
affected private output negatively, the effect was reversed in the second sub-period. For the
participation rate of younger labour force we found an effect similar to that of the full sample
only for 1870-1936. In the second period the effect becomes insignificant. In Figure 8 we present
the derivative function for the model with instrumental variables for the 1870-1936 period:
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– insert Figure 8 about here –
The derivative plot shows that we have a value of zero at Z = 1.6, which again confirms the
visble maxima in Figure 5.
The importance of finding a break in the quadratic form is that it helps resolve the earlier
concern that the data could not distinguish clearly between the quadratic and cubic forms
estimated over the longer time period. The latter alternative was important because it raised
the possibility that further increases in government size could increase rather than decrease
private output per capita. Finding the presence of a break in the early quadratic relation
however makes it apparent that the addition of a linear trend between government size and
output in the post 1937 time period to the quadratic shape arising earlier (when government
size was considerably smaller) has produced the appearance of a tailing off of the inverted U
shape in the later period (and larger size) that is characteristic of the cubic shape estimated in
column (5) of Table 2. That is, the cubic form appears to fit over the full period only because
the quadratic relationship between government size and performance ended in the period just
before WWII. This interpretation is supported by the complementary finding that the power of
the single cubic relationship breaks down when re-estimated over the two sub-periods. In
terms of policy significance, finding that the current time period is better approximated by a
linear trend rather than the upper tail of a quadratic or cubic function means that the cost of
expanding government has remained constant rather than increasing or decreasing in size. While
this finding does not overturn the point that the post WWII expansion in government size in
Canada (i.e., increasing beyond the estimated tipping point) has come at a real cost in terms of
foregone private output, it does diminish the fear that further increases accelerate those costs.
Moreover, the presence of a cost need not imply that the output loss was not worthwhile. Rather
the post-war expansion of government services to accomplish such redistributive objectives as
achieving greater income equality and promoting equity of opportunity may well have been
socially beneficial. By re-emphasizing the point that more government means less of everything
else, the analysis reinforces the policy obligation to consider and justify net benefit before
encouraging further expansion.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that an inverted U-shaped relationship for the effect of government
size on private economic performance holds for Canada with two special caveats. First because
of the time series properties of government size and economic performance, the long term link
with government size should be to the level rather than growth rate of private output. Second,
the appearance of a positive followed by a negative effect of government size on the level of
private performance can be found for Canada only for the early 1870 to 1936 time period. For
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the later time period the effect of size on output has been linear, consistent with constant rather
than increasing cost.
Our identification strategy combines both parametric and nonparametric specifications, with
nonparametric estimation used as a robustness check on the quadratic relationship traditionally
estimated in the literature. Our main finding is that regardless of the statistical model specified,
similar results were always obtained. Finding a tipping point within the neighborhood of a closed
confidence set for our nonparametric test replicated the significance of our earlier parametrically
estimated tipping points. The dual identification strategy also illustrated the robustness of this
result to many of the possible misspecifications typically associated with parametric models.
In terms of the policy implications of our analysis, finding a break in the nonlinear rela-
tionship between government size and private economic performance in the period immediately
following the Great Depression has significance. In particular, if the quadratic estimates had re-
mained stable over the entire period, then the pattern of continuing increases in government size
would have produced ever larger losses in terms of foregone per capita output. Such reasoning
has formed the basis for a number of government policies directed explicitly at restraining or
reversing the growth of government size. Finding that the quadratic form of that relationship is
no longer relevant in the current time period suggests some caution in this regard.12 While our
findings do not challenge the primary conclusion– that more government comes at a cost–the
finding of a linear relationship in the current period does suggest that government has become
successful in holding down or reversing the earlier tendency for cost to increase. Thus while our
finding may be somewhat reassuring with respect to the nature of government costs and the
potential cost of larger government size, nothing in the analysis reverses the need for economists
to be vigilant when evaluating both new and old programs. In particular the ability to recognize
a cost (benefit) in any further expansion (contraction) in size only increases the obligation to
weigh appropriately the concomitant gain (loss) in equity and/or efficiency that will appear the
other side of the trade-off. Evaluating the latter remains the most difficult challenge facing
public policy analysis.
12Note that a reversal of the traditional presumption that government size only grows has been evident in
some OECD countries for some time. See, for example, Borcherding, Ferris and Garzoni (2004).
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8 Appendices
8.1 Appendix A: Economic and Political Variables
AGRIC = percentage of the labour force in agriculture 1870-1925 M.C. Urquhart (1993) Gross
National Product, Derivation of Estimates, p.24; 1926-1975 Cansim D31251/D31252; 1975-2011
Cansim II v2710106/v2710104
GNP = gross national product in current dollars. 1870-1926: Urquhart (1993: 24-25) (in mil-
lions); 1927-1938: Leacy et al. (1983: 130); 19391960 Canadian Economic Observer (Table
1.4), CANSIM D11073 = GNP at market prices. 1961-2011 CANSIM I D16466 = CANSIM II
V499724 (aggregated from quarterly data).
GOV = total federal government expenditure net of interest payments.1870-1989: Gillespie
(1991: 284-286); 1990-1996: Public Accounts of Canada 1996-97: 1997-2000: Federal Govern-
ment Public Accounts, Table 3 Budgetary Revenues Department of Finance web site, September
2001. To this we add the return on government investment (ROI) originally subtracted by Gille-
spie for his own purposes. Expenditure is net of interest paid to the private sector. Data on
ROI: 1870 to 1915: Public Accounts (1917: 64); 1915-1967: Dominion Government Revenue and
Expenditure: Details of Adjustments 1915-1967 Table W-1; 1916-17 to 1966-67: Securing Eco-
nomic Renewal - The Fiscal Plan, Feb 10, 1988, Table XI; 1987-88 to 1996-97: Public Accounts
1996, Table 2.2. Interest on the Debt (ID) was subtracted out (with adjustment for interest paid
to the Bank of Canada (BCI) ultimately returned to the government). Data on ID: 1870-1926:
Leacy et al. (1983: Series H19-34): Federal Government budgetary expenditures, classified by
function, 1867-1975; 1926-1995: Cansim D11166. 1996-2000: Cansim D18445. Finally, data for
BCI: copied by hand from the Annual Reports of The Bank of Canada, Statement of Income
and Expense, Annually, 1935-2000. Net Income paid to the Receiver General (for the Consol-
idated Revenue Acct). Note: all government data are converted from fiscal to calendar years,
and allows for a change in the definition of the fiscal year in 1906/07, as described in Gillespie
(1991: Appendix C).
GSIZE = non-interest federal government, direct public expenditure, calculated as: GOV/GNP.
LnGSize = Log(GSIZE); Ln GSizesq = LnGSize*LnGSize; LnGSizecb = LnGSizesq*LnGSize.
Immigration 1870 1953 O.J. Firestone Canadas Economic Development 1867-1953 Table 83,
Population, Families, Births, Deaths (in thousands); 1954-1995; Cansim D27; 1996-2011 Cansim
II v16.
Imratio = Immigration/POP
P = GNP deflator before 1927 and GDP deflator after (1986 = 100). 1870-1926: Urquhart,
(1993), 24-25; 1927-1995 (1986=100): Cansim data label D14476; 1996-2006 Cansim D140668.
All indexes converted to 1986 = 100 basis.
POP = Canadian population size, 1870 1926, M.C. Urquhart (1993), Gross Nation Product of
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Canada, pp.24,25; 1927-1955 Cansim data label D31248; 1956-2011 Cansim II Table 051-0005.
PYPC = (GNP GOV)/(P*POP); LNPYPC = Log(PYPC).
USiip = US Index of Industrial Production: 1870-1918: Table A15 NBER Nutter 1868-1929;
1919 2011 (INDPRO) Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, G.17 Industrial
Production and Capacity Utilization, Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly, Index 2007=100. Note:
Average of 12 months.
Young = percentage of the population 16/17 and younger; 1870 -1920, Lacey et al (1983) In-
terpolated from Census figures Table A28 -45 sum of columns 29,30,31, and 32, all divided by
28; 1921-1970 Cansim C892547; 1971-2011 Cansim II v466965.
Effective part(icipation) = percentage of the population voting in the federal election =
fraction of the population registered to votes times voter turnout Source: Elections Canada web
site,
www.elections.ca/pastelections/AHistoryoftheV oteinCanada : Appendix Seats = percent-
age of seats won by the winning party. Electoral Results by Election, 1867 to Date. Web site of
the Parliament of Canada: www.parl.gc.ca.
Winningmargin = the percentage of the votes won the winning party minus the percentage
won by its closest rival multiplied by years from the closets election, Electoral results by Party,
1867 to Date. Web site of the Parliament of Canada: www.parl.gc.ca.
8.2 Appendix B.1: Identification of the parametric tipping point -
using quadratics of lnGSize
We follow a similar justification for confidence set identification as in Bernard, Gavin, Khalaf
and Voia (2013). If β1 and β2 in equation (1) are well identified, consistent and asymptotically
normal estimates [denoted βˆ1 and βˆ2] with a tractable variance/covariance matrix [denoted Σˆβ]
are readily available. Plugging βˆ1 and βˆ2 in equation (2) yields a consistent estimate for δ
denoted δˆ. Furthermore, given Σˆβ, a standard error [denoted Σˆ
1/2
δ ] can easily be obtained for
inference on δ via the Delta method. The usual t-statistic
tD (δ0) = (δˆ − δ0)/Σˆ1/2δ
associated with the Null Hypothesis that δ = δ0 where δ0 is any known value, which yields
usual significance tests as well as the standard confidence interval for inference on δ, is thus
easy to derive. Assuming the considered estimator, δˆ = exp(βˆ1/(−2βˆ2)) where βˆ1 and βˆ2 is
consistent and asymptotically normal, the so-called Delta method produces the following 1− α
21
level confidence interval for δ:
limDCS (δ;α) =
[
δˆ ± zα/2Σˆ1/2δ
]
, Σˆδ = Gˆ
′Σˆ12Gˆ, Gˆ =
[
∂δˆ
∂βˆ1
∂δˆ
∂βˆ2
]
=
 exp(βˆ1/(−2βˆ2))−2βˆ2
(βˆ1/2) exp(βˆ1/(−2βˆ2))
βˆ22
 (5)
where zα/2 refers to the two-tailed α-level standard normal cut-off point, and
Σˆ12 =
[
vˆ1 vˆ12
vˆ12 vˆ2
]
refers to the subset of the variance/covariance matrix of the estimates βˆ1 and βˆ2. The Delta
Confidence Set
[
δˆ ± zα/2Σˆ1/2δ
]
collects the values of δ0 for which the t-statistic
tD (δ0) =
(
δˆ − δ0
)
/Σˆ
1/2
δ
associated with
HD(δ0) : δ − δ0
is not significant at the α level. Said differently, if we solve the inequality∣∣∣δˆ − δ0∣∣∣ /Σˆ1/2δ < zα/2 (6)
for δ0, we get
[
δˆ ± zα/2Σˆ1/2δ
]
. In statistics, solving for δ0 in (6) is known as ”inverting the tD (δ0)
test”, where inverting a test with respect to a parameter means collecting all values (here δ0)
not rejected by this test at the α level. If the Delta method is applied when estimating weakly-
identified parameters, denominator close to zero, it produces very tight confidence intervals that
are focused on ”wrong” values, which results in a poor coverage. Also, the estimated intervals
will fail to cover the true parameter value, and given the tightness of the interval estimate, this
will go unnoticed. These problems can be avoided if one applies Fieller based confidence set
estimation method. The Fieller method inverts an alternative t-statistic
tF (d0) = (gˆ1 − d0gˆ2)/[(vˆ1 + d20vˆ2 − 2d0vˆ12)1/2]
associated with
HF (d0) : g1 − d0g2 = 0.
Inverting tF (d0) requires solving for the set of d0 values that are not rejected at level α using
tF (d0) and a standard normal two-tailed cut-off zα/2. In other words, we need to collect the d0
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values such that |tF (d0)| ≤ zα/2 or alternatively such that
(gˆ1 − d0gˆ2)2 ≤ z2α/2(vˆ1 + d20vˆ2 − 2d0vˆ12) (7)
which is a second degree inequality in d0. The resulting solution denoted limFCS (d;α) is either
a bounded interval, an unbounded interval, or the entire real line, where the unbounded solutions
occurs when the denominator is close to zero. HF (d0) can be linked to HD(δ0) for d0 = log(δ0).
Because limFCS (d;α) is obtained as described, taking the exponential of its limits provides the
desired confidence set for δ. This corresponds to projecting the region implied by limFCS (d;α).
We can see that by replacing d0 by log(δ0) in (7) does not distort the inequality nor its statistical
foundations. Solving for δ0 in the resulting inequality would numerically coincide with applying
the exponential to the limits of limFCS (d;α). The tD (δ0) test and limDCS (δ;α) interval will
have α and (1− α) as effective levels, if tD (δ0) asy∼ N(0, 1). The tF (d0) test and limFCS (d;α)
interval will also achieve level control if tF (d0)
asy∼ N(0, 1). Because HD(δ0) requires g2 6= 0,
the Gaussian approximation fails for tD (δ0). In contrast, and because HF (d0) does not require
restricting the parameter space of β2, nor of β1 for that matter
δˆ is asymptotically normal⇒ tF (d0) asy∼ N(0, 1).
It follows that the limFCS (d;α) will achieve level control whether b2 is zero or not. The Fieller
method requires solving inequality (7) for d0, which may be rexeprresd as
Ad20 + 2Bd0 + C ≤ 0 (8)
A = gˆ22 − z2α/2vˆ2, B = −gˆ1gˆ2 + z2α/2vˆ12, C = gˆ21 − z2α/2vˆ1. (9)
Except for a set of measure zero, A 6= 0. Similarly, except for a set of measure zero, ∆ =
B2 − AC 6= 0. Real roots
d01 =
−B −√∆
A
, d02 =
−B +√∆
A
exist if and only if ∆ > 0, so
limFCS (d;α) =
{
[d01, d02] if A > 0
(−∞, d01] ∪ [d02, +∞) if A < 0
. (10)
Bolduc, Khalaf and Yelou (2010) further show that: (i) if ∆ < 0, thenA < 0 and limFCS (d;α) =
R; (ii) limFCS (d;α) contains the point estimate gˆ1/gˆ2 and thus cannot be empty, and (iii)
asymptotically, Fieller’s solution and the Delta method give similar results when the former
leads to an interval, i.e. when the denominator is far from zero. Taking the exponential of the
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limits of limFCS (d;α) provides a confidence set for exp(d).
8.3 Appendix B.2: Identification of the parametric tipping point -
using cubics for lnGSize
For the cubic model in lnGSize:
ln
(
yt
Nt
)
= β0+β1 lnGSizet+β2 lnGSize
2
t+β3 lnGSize
3
t+β4 lnAgrict+β5 lnY oungt+β6 lnUSiipt+ut
(11)
With parameters β1, β2 and β3, where β3 is not weakly identified, we can construct the confidence
sets using the Delta method for both possibile tipping points (min and max). Consider that the
first tipping point is a maximum and the second tipping point is a minimum as identified in our
regression. The two tipping points are identified by solving:
∂ ln
(
yt
Nt
)
∂ lnGSize
= 0. (12)
Solving the above equation gives:
lnGSizemax;min =
−β2 ∓
√
β22 − 3β1β3
3β3
. (13)
The tipping points for maximum and minimum can be then obtained by taking the exponential
of lnGSizemin;max, which is a monotone transformation of the transformed log measure obtaiend
from the regression:
GSizemax;min = e
−β2∓
√
β22−3β1β3
3β3 . (14)
Consider θ = {β1, β2, β3} is the set of the three parameters used to identify the tipping points.
The variances for the two tipping points are obtained using Delta method as foolws:
V ar(GSizemax;min) = DΣD
′ =
(
∂GSizemin;max
∂θ
)
Σ
(
∂GSizemin;max
∂θ
)′
(15)
where
∂GSizemax;min
∂θ
=
(
∂GSizemamx;min
∂β1
∂GSizemax;min
∂β2
∂GSizemax;min
∂β3
)
and Σ is defined as:
Σ =
 σ2β1 σβ1β2 σβ1β3σβ2β1 σ2β2 σβ2β3
σβ3β1 σβ3β2 σ
2
β3
 .
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For our specific case where the first tipping point is a maximum, ∂GSizemax
∂β1
, ∂GSizemax
∂β2
and
∂GSizemax
∂β3
are:
∂GSizemax
∂β1
= e
−β2−
√
β22−3β1β3
3β3
(
(β22 − 3β1β3)−0.5
2
)
,
∂GSizemax
∂β2
= e
−β2−
√
β22−3β1β3
3β3
(−1− β2(β22 − 3β1β3)−0.5
3β3
)
,
and
∂GSizemax
∂β3
= e
−β2−
√
β22−3β1β3
3β3
(
β2 + 3β1β3(β
2
2 − 3β1β3)−0.5 + (β22 − 3β1β3)0.5
3β23
)
.
When the second tipping point is a minimum, ∂GSizemin
∂β1
, ∂GSizemin
∂β2
and ∂GSizemin
∂β3
are:
∂GSizemin
∂β1
= −e
−β2+
√
β22−3β1β3
3β3
(
(β22 − 3β1β3)−0.5
2
)
,
∂GSizemin
∂β2
= e
−β2+
√
β22−3β1β3
3β3
(−1 + β2(β22 − 3β1β3)−0.5
3β3
)
,
and
∂GSizemin
∂β3
= e
−β2+
√
β22−3β1β3
3β3
(
β2 − 3β1β3(β22 − 3β1β3)−0.5 − (β22 − 3β1β3)0.5
3β23
)
.
Therefore V ar(GSizemax,min) can be expressed as:
V ar(GSizemax,min) =
(
∂GSizemax,min
∂β1
)2
σ2β1 + 2
(
∂GSizemax,min
∂β1
)(
∂GSizemax,min
∂β2
)
σβ1β2+
+2
(
∂GSizemax,min
∂β1
)(
∂GSizemax,min
∂β3
)
σβ1β3 +
(
∂GSizemax,min
∂β2
)2
σ2β2
+2
(
∂GSizemax,in
∂β2
)(
∂GSizemax,min
∂β3
)
σβ2β3 +
(
∂GSizemax,min
∂β3
)2
σ2β3
With the help of Delta method the following confidence interval 1− α level confidence interval
for GSizemax,min:
DCS (GSizemax,min;α) =
[
̂GSizemax,min ± zα/2
√
̂V ar(GSizemax;min)
]
(16)
where zα/2 refers to the two-tailed α-level standard normal cut-off point.
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8.4 Appendix C: B-splines
The method from Ma and Racine (2013) uses a B-spline function for f(.), which is a linear
combination of B-splines of degree m defined as follows
B(x) =
N+m∑
c=0
bcBc,m(x), x ∈ [k0, kN+1]
where bc are denoted ”control points”, k0, ..., kN+1 are known as a knot sequence [an individual
term in this sequence is known as a knot],
Bc,0(x) =
{
1 kc ≤ x < kc+1
0 otherwise
}
which is referred to as the ‘intercept’, and
Bc,j+1(x) = ac,j+1(x)Bc,j(x) + [1− ac+1,j+1(x)]Bc+1,j(x),
ac,j+1(x) =
{
x−kc
kc+j−kc kc+j 6= kc
0 otherwise
}
.
The unknown function f(.) is estimated by least squares as
Bˆ(GovSizeit; covariatest) = argminB(.)
n∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
[
Y
N t
− B(covariatest)
]2
.
Explicitly, this requires the estimation of the control points bc. If covariates are considered
endogenous and instruments provided, 2SLS is also possible. Underlying best fit parameters are
selected by cross-validation; see Racine and Yang (2011) for further details. Further description
of this R-package is available at: http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/crs/crs.pdf.
8.5 Appendix D: nonparametric IV
Given the outcome Y (private output), the instrumental regression function φ(GSize, Controls)
is identified through an instrumental variable but is not assumed to be known up to finitely many
parameters.
Y = φ(Gsize,X) + U ; (17)
with
E(U |W ) = 0,
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for endogeneous (Gsize), exogeneous (X), all instruments (W) and φ a function that satisfies
regularity conditions but is otherwise unknown. The equation above define the structural econo-
metric model:
E[Y − φ(Gsize,X)|W ] = 0. (18)
We can estimate the function φ, by using Horowitz (2011) . In particular if we denote by φˆj,
with j = 1, ..., Jn the generalized Fourier coefficients of φˆ, we have:
φˆ =
Jn∑
j=1
φˆjψj(x), (19)
where ψj(x) can be trigonometric functions, orthogonal polynomials, or splines. If we define by
Φˆ = (φˆ1, ..., φˆJ)
Φˆ = (W ′nXn)
−1WnYn, (20)
Φˆ has the form of an IV estimator for a linear model in which the matrix of variables is Xn
and the matrix of instruments is Wn . When the number of obsrevation n is small, φˆj can have
higher variation and therefore more unstable. To stabilize φˆj, Blundell, Chen and Kristensen
(2007) is used as they provide an analytical solution to this problem that it is easy to compute.
9 Tables
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Data Sources
Variable Name Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Deviation ADF Stat ADF of first difference
LNPYPC 8.67 10.08 7.33 0.834 -0.091 -10.02***
lnGSize 2.26 3.77 1.25 0.603 -1.84 -7.47***
lnGSizesq 5.49 14.19 1.57 2.77 -1.88 -8.28***
lnAgric 2.78 4.07 0.54 1.17 2.02 -7.67***
lnYoung 3.55 3.88 2.99 0.232 0.93 -3.87***
lnUSiip 5.43 7.74 2.43 1.59 -1.44 -12.07***
lnImratio -0.297 1.66 -2.67 0.85 -2.58* -10.06***
lnEffective-part 3.38 3.96 2.1 0.58 -2.22 -12.14***
lnSeats 4.07 4.36 3.7 0.16 -4.91***
lnWinningmargin -2.38 -0.99 -3.41 0.54 -2.11 -11.74***
*** (**) [*] significantly different from zero at 1%(5%)[10%] using the MacKinnon (1996) critical values
-3.48 (-2.88) [-2.58].
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Table 2. The Effect of Government Size on Private Output Per Capita (full sample)
LNPYPC LNPYPC LNPYPC LNPYPC LNPYPC
Regression type OLS DOLS 2SLS 2SLS; DOLS 2SLS; DOLS
LnGSize 0.148 0.00003 1.279* 0.830** 10.59**
1.64 0.001 1.84 2.03 2.46
LnGSizesq -0.059 -0.033 -0.304** -0.222** -4.59**
-3.24 -0.86 -2.05 -2.53 -2.21
LnGSizecb 0.614**
2.29
LnAgric -0.226 -0.260*** -0.190*** -0.231*** -0.479***
-12.78 -10.71 -5.53 -9.33 -4.11
LnYoung -0.233 -0.025 -0.293*** 0.055 0.956**
-6.48 -0.35 -3.12 0.61 2.35
LnUSiip 0.364 0.384*** 0.362*** 0.412*** 0.439***
26.7 19.68 12.65 19.31 17.4
CONSTANT 7.1 6.39*** 6.17*** 5.16*** -2.076
53.93 20 8.44 9.7 -0.58
No. of Observations 142 137 142 137 137
Adj R2 0.995 0.986 0.997 0.995
Durbin-Watson (5, 142) 0.496
ADFM -4.95** -6.07*** -4.34* -6.12*** -5.93***
Test of endogenous regressors: P-value 0.048 0.014 0.0009
Estimated Tipping point 8.14% 6.49% 6.11%
Second row of results represent the t-stat for each susequent table.
* (**) [***] significantly different from zero at 10, (5), and [1] percent
ADFM MacKinnon (2010) critical cointegration values at 5% ∗ ∗(1% ∗ ∗∗) : −4.82(−5.43) The DOLS
versions regressions use the first difference of each covariate together with their two leads and lags.
The 2SLS versions use as instruments for government size the two political variables: the logarithm of
effective electoral participation and percentage of seats held by the winning political party, together
with the immigration rate.
Table 3. Structural Change Tests for the Proposed Conditional Model of ln(GDP-Gov):
Ho: no Structural Change
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Test Value P-Value
Chow Test [K, N-2*K] 4.7938 0.0002
Fisher Test [N2,(N1-K)] 8.7768 0.000
Wald Test 31.4181 0.0000
Likelihood Ratio Test 28.3827 0.0000
Lagrange Multiplier Test 25.7261 0.0001
Note: Test performed for N1: 1st Period Obs = 67 and N2: 2nd Period Obs = 75
Table 4. Zivot-Andrews unit root test allowing for breaks in ln(GDP-Gov)
Test Minimum t-statistics at year 1936 Critical Value at 5 %
Zivot-Andrews -3.924 -4.11
Note: Break identified at year 1936 (obs 67)
Table 5. The Effect of Government Size on Private Output Per Capita:
Case I: 1870 - 1936 and Case II: 1937-2011
Model 2SLS; DOLS: LNPYPC 2SLS; DOLS: LNPYPC 2SLS; DOLS: LNPYPC
Subsample 1870 - 1936 1937 - 2011 (1) 1937 - 2011 (2)
LnGSize 5.187*** 0.149 -0.179***
8.20 0.31 -3.65
LnGSizesq -1.366*** -0.049
-8.20 -0.60
LnAgric 0.581** -0.234*** -1.189
1.99 -4.43 -4.12
LnYoung 2.485*** -0.143 -0.36
-6.48 -1.35 -0.68
LnUSiip 0.764*** 0.391*** 0.484***
6.87 7.19 8.20
CONSTANT -8.55*** 6.51*** 6.162***
-3.07 17.37 17.95
No. of Observations 64 73 73
AdjR2 0.995 0.999 0.998
Estimated Tipping point 6.67% 0% 0%
* (**) [***] significantly different from zero at 10, (5), and [1] percent.
The DOLS versions regressions use the first difference of each covariate together with their two leads
and lags.
The 2SLS versions use as instruments for government size two political variables: the logarithm of
effective electoral participation and percentage of seats held by the winning political party, together
29
with the immigration rate.
(1) - quadratic model in Ln GSize; (2) - linear model in Ln GSize.
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Figure 1: The Logarithms of Federal Government Size, Private per capita Output and its
Growth Rate: Canada 1870 2011
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Figure 2: The Effects of Government Size and Tipping Point
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Figure 3: ln(GDP-Gov) = f(GSize,X), no instruments, full period
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Figure 4: ln(GDP-Gov) = f(GSize,X), with instruments, full period
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Figure 5: Derivative = f(Z=ĜSize), 1870-2011
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Figure 6: ln(GDP-Gov) = f(GSize,X), with instruments, 1870-1936
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Figure 7: ln(GDP-Gov) = f(GSize,X), with instruments, 1937-2011
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Figure 8: Derivative =f(Z=ĜSize), 1870-1936
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